Why does hippocrates call medicine an art

Rhet I 1, a14—18 , and so he would think that someone familiar with medicine would instinctively recognize that its end is health. However, Aristotle also thinks that one can recognize a truth in a general way without really understanding it and without being able to expound or defend it cf.

Thus, when the doctor as such treats an incurably sick patient by prescribing pain-relieving drugs or by administering other palliative care, he does so because the expected results of such care are somehow an approximation to health. Plato would have been somewhat sympathetic to thoughts like this: he has Socrates argue in the Phaedo that the soul is better off when it is separated from the body 66d7—7b1.

Hence any doctor who used the medical art to destroy bodily health, even when aiming at mental or spiritual health, would not be giving medical care and would be acting contrary to the medical art. Of course, as we also noted earlier, a patient may also have good reasons for not pursuing the highest degree of health attainable, and this may occur near the end of life when the patient may choose not to pursue every possible medical means of staying alive.

A doctor may respect these wishes and not treat a patient against his will. Nevertheless, in refraining from using the medical art, a doctor is not thereby acting contrary to the medical art. In order to act contrary to the medical art, one must use the medical art and use it in a way that is contrary to its inherent end. There may, of course, be some cases where refraining from using the medical art would be unjust—for example, when a doctor has already received appropriate payment cf.

NE V 5, a14— Yet this alone does not make something contrary to the art: the medical art is inherently teleological but not inherently ethical. We have now seen how Aristotle would address various challenges to the view that using medicine to kill is contrary to the nature of the art. Let us now ask two final questions.

If the thanatologist expertly produces death by producing disease, then he must also understand the nature of the disease that he is producing and this will require knowledge of health. This is because disease is a privation of health and so must be understood through the positive form of health. However, because expertise is always properly of the positive form and incidentally of the privation, the thanatologist would be using his expertise of health to produce disease and death.

The answer must be: in one way, yes, and in another way, no. For the body as a whole may be called healthy and a bodily part may be called healthy, but the doctor primarily aims at the former and only secondarily at the latter. Thus, it is always contrary to the medical art to destroy the health of the whole body, but it is only generally but not always contrary to the medical art to destroy the health of any part of the body.

This is because some bodily parts are more important than others with respect to the health of the whole body see EE VIII 3, b14—16, quoted in Section 3. Thus, a doctor might remove a bodily organ or destroy its health in order to preserve the health of more important bodily organs and thereby the health of the whole body cf. Pol VIII 1, a27—30 , but a doctor, as a doctor, will not destroy the health of an organ unless that will promote the health of the whole body.

Even if patients should claim that the destruction of certain organs would promote their happiness or mental health, that will not matter.

We have seen that Aristotle is prepared to explain and defend this seemingly commonsensical claim by means of a philosophically sophisticated account of medicine. In that account, Aristotle delineates the teleological structure of medicine by making use of various powerful distinctions—e.

Aristotle also recognizes that the medical art can be systematically distorted in practice, and he seems to think that it is proper for the politician to guard against such distortion by regulating the medical art. This is especially so because the politician will want to use the medical art in order to promote the health of the citizens and so must recognize that the inherent nature of medical art determines what can properly count as medical care Section 8.

Nevertheless, the medical art is not inherently ethical or political Sections 4 and 5. Such laws would need to be justified by reference to the common good of the polis.

NE I 13, a7—10; V 1, b19—25; V 2, b23—4 , it seems that he could not allow suffering patients to kill themselves, even with the help of a doctor cf. NE V 11, a5—7. However, even if the politician could allow physician-assisted suicide, that would not make it medical care, and it will always be contrary to the medical art.

Moreover, Aristotle surely thinks that the politician will always have some good reason to regulate the medical art in such a way that its inherent nature is preserved.

We have so far focused on one straightforward reason—namely, that an undistorted medical art will be more effective in promoting the health of the citizens—but there are a number of other interconnected reasons that one might glean from the text of Aristotle. In conclusion, I want to give you a sense of these various reasons by briefly discussing four in particular. First, Aristotle thinks that the medical art has progressed Pol II 8, b32—8 , and he also thinks that in order for an art to progress, its outline structure needs to be sound NE I 7, a22— Aristotle would also think, second, that a distorted medical art can impede one from achieving virtuous action.

For example, both politicians and ordinary citizens need to rely on the expertise of doctors for a correct understanding of health cf. Top II 2, a20—22 , and the virtue of temperance—the virtue concerned with pleasures of the body—seems to require some adequate knowledge of health NE III 11, a16— Consequently, if politicians and citizens are given a distorted understanding of health by their doctors, temperate action will be impeded both individually and collectively.

Third, a systematic distortion of the medical art can alienate the patient from the doctor. Aristotle thinks that patients who wish to become healthy must obey their doctors NE VI 12, b30—3 , but in order for this to occur, patients must trust their doctors NE IX 2, b22—5.

However, this trust will surely be eroded cf. Fourth and finally, Aristotle would also think that any doctor who uses the medical art contrary to its nature will inevitably be alienated from his product cf. Top VI 5, a4—5. A suitable treatment of this issue must be reserved for another occasion, but the basic rationale is as follows. Every craftsman or artisan, as such, loves his proper product because it reveals the being of the art inside of him NE IX 7, b33—8a9.

Thus, the doctor, as such, loves the health that he produces because it reveals the being of the medical art inside of him. Moreover, the doctor, as such, will take pleasure in healing and in the health he produces because each person takes pleasure in what he loves NE I 8, a7— However, disease does not reveal the being of the medical art because the medical art is essentially of health and only incidentally of disease Section 7.

Consequently, the doctor, as such, cannot love or take pleasure in the disease that he produces in the patient, and this is so even when that disease is causing the kind of death that the patient may desire. Ackrill, J. Rorty, 15— Berkeley: University of California Press. Search in Google Scholar. Ahonen, M.

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Fulford, 37— Johansen, T. Jones, W. Canterbury seems to have been a particularly important pilgrimage destination for people suffering from bleeding disorders—perhaps because of the blood shed by Thomas at his martyrdom Pilgrims arriving at their destination would be able to touch the relics and even carry home with them secondary relics—perhaps a piece of cloth that had been applied to a reliquary, or an ampulla of liquid that had been poured over a tomb These secondary relics could then be used to heal those who were too ill to make the journey.

Ultimately, the power of faith was potent medicine for the sick in the Middle Ages. Goldiner, Sigrid. Bagnoli, Martina, et al. Cleveland: Cleveland Museum of Art, Caviness, Madeline Harrison. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Gottfried, Robert S. New York: The Free Press, McVaugh, Michael R.

Medicine before the Plague. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Rawcliffe, Carole. Stroud, England: Alan Sutton, Siraisi, Nancy G. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Visiting The Met? Sarcophagus with a Greek Physician. Earthenware Pilgrim Flask with Saint Menas.

Processional Cross. Arm Reliquary. Shoe Reliquary. Pilgrim's Badge of the Shrine of St. Thomas Becket at Canterbury. Apothecary jar orciuolo perhaps workshop of Giunta di Tugio. Saint Fiacre. Citation Goldiner, Sigrid.

Grieve, Maud. A Modern Herbal. New York: Dover, Arabian Peninsula, — A. Arabian Peninsula, 1— A. Review a Brill Book. Reference Works. Primary source collections.

Open Access Content. Contact us. Sales contacts. Publishing contacts. Social Media Overview. Terms and Conditions. Privacy Statement. Login to my Brill account Create Brill Account. Author: Joel Mann. On the art of medicine , or de Arte , embodies as perhaps no other ancient text the full flower of the sophistic movement of the fifth century BCE.

It is a rhetorical epideixis in which forensic oratory, philosophy, and medicine are woven into an ambitious display of sophistic polymathy. Copyright Year: E-Book PDF. Login via Institution. Prices from excl. VAT :. View PDF Flyer. Contents About. By: Joel E. Pages: 51— Pages: 57— Pages: 65— Pages: — Biographical Note Joel E.