What is the significance of gregg v. georgia

Indeed, the actions of juries in many States since Furman are fully compatible with the legislative judgments, reflected in the new statutes, as to the continued utility and necessity of capital punishment in appropriate cases. At the close of , at least persons had been sentenced to death since Furman, [ Footnote 27 ] and, by the end of March, , more than persons were subject to death sentences. As we have seen, however, the Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society.

The Court also must ask whether it comports with the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment.

Although we cannot "invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe penalties adequate to serve the ends of. Wilkerson v. The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.

In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.

When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy -- of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law. New York, U. Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.

If an effect were observed and the observed effects, one way or another, are not large , then one could not at all tell whether any of this effect is attributable to the presence or absence of capital punishment. A 'scientific' -- that is to say, a soundly based -- conclusion is simply impossible, and no methodological path out of this tangle suggests itself. Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, [ Footnote 32 ] there is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view.

We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant.

There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts.

Indeed, many of the post- Furman statutes reflect just such a responsible effort to define those crimes and those criminals for which capital punishment is most probably an effective deterrent. In sum, we cannot say that the judgment of the Georgia Legislature that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.

Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature. Finally, we must consider whether the punishment of death is disproportionate in relation to the crime for which it is imposed. There is no question that death, as a punishment, is unique in its severity and irrevocability. When a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed.

Alabama, U. Covert, U. But we are concerned here only with the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of murder, and, when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, [ Footnote 35 ] we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes. We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it.

While Furman did not hold that the infliction of the death penalty per se violates the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishments, it did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice. Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

Indeed, the death sentences examined by the Court in Furman were. For, of all the people convicted of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed. Furman mandates that, where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.

It is certainly not a novel proposition that discretion in the area of sentencing be exercised in an informed manner. We have long recognized that,.

Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, U. See also Williams v. Oklahoma, U. Draft Draft No. The cited studies assumed that the trial judge would be the sentencing authority. If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information about a defendant and the crime he committed in order to be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a sentencing decision.

But it creates special problems. Much of the information that is relevant to the sentencing decision may have no relevance to the question of guilt, or may even be extremely prejudicial to a fair determination of that question. Those who have studied the question suggest that a bifurcated procedure -- one in which the. The drafters of the Model Penal Code concluded:. Trial lawyers understandably have little confidence in a solution that admits the evidence and trusts to an instruction to the jury that it should be considered only in determining the penalty and disregarded in assessing guilt.

The obvious solution. This is the analogue of the procedure in the ordinary case when capital punishment is not in issue; the court conducts a separate inquiry before imposing sentence. See also Spencer v. When a human life is at stake, and when the jury must have information prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order to impose a rational sentence, a bifurcated.

But the provision of relevant information under fair procedural rules is not alone sufficient to guarantee that the information will be properly used in the imposition of punishment, especially if sentencing is performed by a jury. Since the members of a jury will have had little, if any, previous experience in sentencing, they are unlikely to be skilled in dealing with the information they are given. To the extent that this problem is inherent in jury sentencing, it may not be totally correctable.

It seems clear, however, that the problem will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision. Juries are invariably given careful instructions on the law and how to apply it before they are authorized to decide the merits of a lawsuit.

It would be virtually unthinkable to follow any other course in a legal system that has traditionally operated by following prior precedents and fixed rules of law. Champlin Refining Co. Rule Civ. When erroneous instructions are given, retrial is often required. It is quite simply a hallmark of our legal system that juries be carefully and adequately guided in their deliberations.

While some have suggested that standards to guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are impossible to formulate, [ Footnote 43 ] the fact is that such standards have been developed. When the drafters of the Model Penal Code faced this problem, they concluded.

In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.

As a general proposition, these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information. We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be permissible under Furman, or that any sentencing system constructed along these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, [ Footnote 46 ] for each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis.

Rather, we have embarked upon this general exposition to make clear that it is possible to construct capital sentencing systems capable of meeting Furman's constitutional concerns. We now turn to consideration of the constitutionality of Georgia's capital sentencing procedures. In the wake of Furman, Georgia amended its capital punishment statute, but chose not to narrow the scope of its murder provisions.

See Part II , supra. Thus, now, as before Furman, in Georgia,. All persons convicted of murder "shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life. Georgia did act, however, to narrow the class of murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying These procedures require the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence.

No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction, decide whether he should live or die.

Instead, the jury's attention is directed to the specific circumstances of the crime: was it committed in the course of another capital felony?

Was it committed for money? Was it committed upon a peace officer or judicial officer? Was it committed in a particularly heinous way, or in a manner that endangered the lives of many persons? In addition, the jury's attention is focused on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime: does he have a record of prior convictions for capital offenses?

Are there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment e. As an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for automatic appeal of all death sentences to the State's Supreme Court. That court is required by statute to review each sentence of death and determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases.

In short, Georgia's new sentencing procedures require, as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, specific jury findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant. Moreover, to guard further against a situation comparable to that presented in Furman, the Supreme Court of Georgia compares each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate.

On their face, these procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman. No longer should there be "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.

The petitioner contends, however, that the changes in the Georgia sentencing procedures are only cosmetic, that the arbitrariness and capriciousness condemned by Furman continue to exist in Georgia -- both in traditional practices that still remain and in the new sentencing procedures adopted in response to Furman.

First, the petitioner focuses on the opportunities for discretionary action that are inherent in the processing of any murder case under Georgia law. He notes that the state prosecutor has unfettered authority to select those persons whom he wishes to prosecute for a capital offense and to plea bargain with them. Further, at the trial, the jury may choose to convict a defendant of a lesser included offense rather than find him guilty of a crime punishable by death, even if the evidence would support a capital verdict.

And finally, a defendant who is convicted and sentenced to die may have his sentence commuted by the Governor of the State and the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. The existence of these discretionary stages is not determinative of the issues before us. At each of these stages, an actor in the criminal justice system makes a decision which may remove a defendant from consideration as a candidate for the death penalty.

Furman, in contrast, dealt with the decision to impose the death sentence on a specific individual who had been convicted of a capital offense. Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution.

Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards, so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant. The petitioner further contends that the capital sentencing procedures adopted by Georgia in response to Furman do not eliminate the dangers of arbitrariness and caprice in jury sentencing that were held in Furman to be violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

He claims that the statute is so broad and vague as to leave juries free to act as arbitrarily and capriciously as they wish in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.

While there is no claim that the jury in this case relied upon a vague or overbroad provision to establish the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the petitioner looks to the sentencing system as a whole as the Court did in Furman and we do today , and argues that it fails to reduce sufficiently the risk of arbitrary infliction of death sentences.

Specifically, Gregg urges that the statutory aggravating circumstances are too broad and too vague, that the sentencing procedure allows for arbitrary grants of mercy, and that the scope of the evidence and argument that can be considered at the presentence hearing is too wide. The petitioner attacks the seventh statutory aggravating circumstance, which authorizes imposition of the death penalty if the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim," contending that it is so broad that capital punishment could be imposed in any murder case.

But this language need not be construed in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction. The petitioner also argues that two of the statutory aggravating circumstances are vague, and therefore susceptible of widely differing interpretations, thus creating a substantial risk that the death penalty will be arbitrarily inflicted by Georgia juries.

It held this provision to be impermissibly vague in Arnold v. The only case in which the court upheld a conviction in reliance on this aggravating circumstance involved a man who stood up in a church and fired a gun indiscriminately into the audience. Chenault v. On the other hand, the court expressly reversed a finding of great risk when the victim was simply kidnaped in a parking lot.

See Jarrell v. The petitioner next argues that the requirements of Furman are not met here, because the jury has the power to decline to impose the death penalty even if it finds that one or more statutory aggravating circumstances are present in the case. This contention misinterprets Furman. See supra at U. Moreover, it ignores the role of the Supreme Court of Georgia, which reviews each death sentence to determine whether it is proportional to other sentences imposed for similar crimes.

Since the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the penalty, the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice. The petitioner objects, finally, to the wide scope of evidence and argument allowed at presentence hearings.

We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing, and to approve open and far-ranging argument. See, e.

So long as the. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision. Finally, the Georgia statute has an additional provision designed to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously selected group of convicted defendants.

The new sentencing procedures require that the State Supreme Court review every death sentence to determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, whether the evidence supports the findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and. Coley v. The court, on another occasion, stated that. Moore v. See also Jarrell v. State, supra at , S. It is apparent that the Supreme Court of Georgia has taken its review responsibilities seriously.

In Coley, it held that. It thereupon reduced Coley's sentence from death to life imprisonment. Thus, under the test provided by statute,.

The court therefore vacated Gregg's death sentences for armed robbery, and has followed a similar course in every other armed robbery death penalty case to come before it. See Floyd v. See Dorsey v. The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.

In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death. The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily.

Under the procedures before the Court in that case, sentencing authorities were not directed to give attention to the nature or circumstances of the crime committed or to the character or record of the defendant. Left unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only be called freakish. The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant.

While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty of death. In this way, the jury's discretion is channeled.

No longer. In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we hold that the statutory system under which Gregg was sentenced to death does not violate the Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court is affirmed.

On cross-examination, the State introduced a letter written by the petitioner to Allen entitled, "[a] statement for you," with the instructions that Allen memorize and then burn it. The statement was consistent with the petitioner's testimony at trial. The court further held, in part, that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury with respect to voluntary manslaughter, since there was no evidence to support that verdict. Subsequent to the trial in this case, limited portions of the Georgia statute were amended.

None of these amendments changed significantly the substance of the statutory scheme. All references to the statute in this opinion are to the current version. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.

The offense robbery by intimidation shall be a lesser included offense in the offense of armed robbery. A person convicted of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.

These capital felonies currently are defined as they were when Furman was decided. The amendments to the Georgia statute, however, narrowed the class of crimes potentially punishable by death by eliminating capital perjury. It is not clear whether the amendments to the Georgia statute were intended to broaden the types of evidence admissible at the presentence hearing.

Essentially the same procedures are followed in the case of a guilty plea. The judge considers the factual basis of the plea, as well as evidence in aggravation and mitigation. See Mitchell v. The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt.

In non-jury cases the judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in section The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Arnold v. The statute requires that the Supreme Court of Georgia obtain and preserve the records of all capital felony cases in which the death penalty was imposed after January 1, , or such earlier date that the court considers appropriate.

To aid the court in its disposition of these cases, the statute further provides for the appointment of a special assistant, and authorizes the employment of additional staff members. See Ga. Louisiana ex rel. See also McGautha v. Since five Justices wrote separately in support of the judgments in Furman, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds -- MR.

See n 36, infra. This conclusion derives primarily from statements made during the debates in the various state conventions called to ratify the Federal Constitution. For example, Virginia delegate Patrick Henry objected vehemently to the lack of a provision banning "cruel and unusual punishments":.

But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany -- of torturing to extort a confession of the crime. Elliot, Debates A similar objection was made in the Massachusetts convention:. The Court remarked on the fact that the law under review "has come to us from a government of a different form and genius from ours," but it also noted that the punishments it inflicted "would have those bad attributes even if they were found in a Federal enactment and not taken from an alien source.

Although legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen representatives provide one important means of ascertaining contemporary values, it is evident that legislative judgments alone cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment standards, since that Amendment was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative power. See Weems v. At the time of Robinson, nine States in addition to California had criminal laws that punished addiction similar to the law declared unconstitutional in Robinson.

See Brief for Appellant in Robinson v. California, O. The temptations to cross that policy line are very great. See concurring opinions of MR. See concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Douglas, MR. Laws , c. Code, art. Codes Ann. Code Supp. Laws , Act No. Laws Ann. Penal Code Ann. In , the people of Massachusetts were asked "Shall the commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. In a December, , referendum, the voters of Illinois also rejected the abolition of capital punishment by 1,, votes to , votes.

The number of prisoners who received death sentences in the years from to varied from a high of in to a low of 75 in , with wide fluctuations in the intervening years: in ; 93 in ; in ; 86 in ; in ; 85 in ; in ; 97 in ; in ; and in Another purpose that has been discussed is the incapacitation of dangerous criminals, and the consequent prevention of crimes that they may otherwise commit in the future.

See People v. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else. The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrongdoer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is deterrent or not. Bedau ed. Other types of calculated murders, apparently occurring with increasing frequency, include the use of bombs or other means of indiscriminate killings, the extortion murder of hostages or kidnap victims, and the execution-style killing of witnesses to a crime.

We have been shown no statistics breaking down the total number of murders into the categories described above. The overall trend in the number of murders committed in the nation, however, has been upward for some time. In , reported murders totaled an estimated 9, In , the year Furman was announced, the total estimated was 18, We do not address here the question whether the taking of the criminal's life is a proportionate sanction where no victim has been deprived of life -- for example, when capital punishment is imposed for rape, kidnaping, or armed robbery that does not result in the death of any human being.

This view was expressed by other Members of the Court who concurred in the judgments. See U. The dissenters viewed this concern as the basis for the Furman decision:.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require as a matter of course that a presentence report containing information about a defendant's background be prepared for use by the sentencing judge. Rule 32 c. The importance of obtaining accurate sentencing information is underscored by the Rule's direction to the sentencing court to. Indeed, we hold elsewhere today that, in capital cases, it is constitutionally required that the sentencing authority have information sufficient to enable it to consider the character and individual circumstances of a defendant prior to imposition of a death sentence.

In other situations, this Court has concluded that a jury cannot be expected to consider certain evidence before it on one issue, but not another. Denno, U. In United States v. Jackson, U. In holding that the statute was constitutionally invalid, the Court noted:. If the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional.

But see Md. Maryland judges, however, typically give advisory instructions on the law to the jury. See Md. Rule ; Wilson v. State, Md. See McGautha v. As MR. A system could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.

In McGautha v. California, supra, this Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require that a jury be provided with standards to guide its decision whether to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment or death or that the capital sentencing proceeding be separated from the guilt-determination process. McGautha was not an Eighth Amendment decision, and, to the extent it purported to deal with Eighth Amendment concerns, it must be read in light of the opinions in Furman v.

There, the Court ruled that death sentences imposed under statutes that left juries with untrammeled discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. While Furman did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly in substantial tension with a broad reading of McGautha's holding. In view of Furman, McGautha can be viewed rationally as a precedent only for the proposition that standardless jury sentencing procedures were not employed in the cases there before the Court, so as to violate the Due Process Clause.

We note that McGautha's assumption that it is not possible to devise standards to guide and regularize jury sentencing in capital cases has been undermined by subsequent experience.

In view of that experience and the considerations set forth in the text, we adhere to Furman's determination that, where the ultimate punishment of death is at issue, a system of standardless jury discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The text of the statute enumerating the various aggravating circumstances is set out at n 9, supra. See Moore v. The petitioner's argument is nothing more than a veiled contention that Furman indirectly outlawed capital punishment by placing totally unrealistic conditions on its use. In order to repair the alleged defects pointed to by the petitioner, it would be necessary to require that prosecuting authorities charge a capital offense whenever arguably there had been a capital murder, and that they refuse to plea bargain with the defendant.

If a jury refused to convict even though the evidence supported the charge, its verdict would have to be reversed and a verdict of guilty entered or a new trial ordered, since the discretionary act of jury nullification would not be permitted. Finally, acts of executive clemency would have to be prohibited. Such a system, of course, would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice. Moreover, it would be unconstitutional.

Such a system, in many respects, would have the vices of the mandatory death penalty statutes we hold unconstitutional today in Woodson v. North Carolina, post, p. Louisiana, post, p. The suggestion that a jury's verdict of acquittal could be overturned and a defendant retried would run afoul of the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

In the federal system, it also would be unconstitutional to prohibit a President from deciding, as an act of executive clemency, to reprieve one sentenced to death. In light of the limited grant of certiorari, see supra at U.

In the course of interpreting Florida's new capital sentencing statute, the Supreme Court of Florida has ruled that the phrase "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" means a "conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. Dixon, So. See Proffitt v. Florida, post at U.

In both cases, a separate statutory aggravating circumstance was also found, and the Supreme Court of Georgia did not explicitly rely on the finding of the seventh circumstance when it upheld the death sentence. As we have noted in answering his overbreadth argument concerning this section, however, the state court has not given a broad reading to the scope of this provision, and there is no reason to think that juries will not be able to understand it.

But we are concerned here only with the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of murder, and, when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime.

It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes. We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we hold that the statutory system under which Gregg was sentenced to death does not violate the Constitution.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court is affirmed. The threshold question in this case is whether the death penalty may be carried out for murder under the Georgia legislative scheme consistent with the decision in Furman v. This cannot be accepted as a proposition of constitutional law. Imposition of the death penalty is surely an awesome responsibility for any system of justice and those who participate in it.

Mistakes will be made, and discriminations will occur which will be difficult to explain. I decline to interfere with the manner in which Georgia has chosen to enforce such laws on what is simply an assertion of lack of faith in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a fundamentally fair manner. Those opinions hold further that, so viewed, the Clause invalidates the mandatory infliction of the death penalty but not its infliction under sentencing procedures that Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens conclude adequately safeguard against the risk that the death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

In Furman v. I there said:. Although pragmatic arguments for and against the punishment have been frequently advanced, this longstanding and heated controversy cannot be explained solely as the result of differences over the practical wisdom of a particular government policy.

At bottom, the battle has been waged on moral grounds. The country has debated whether a society for which the dignity of the individual is the supreme value can, without a fundamental inconsistency, follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members to death.

In the United States, as in other nations of the western world, the struggle about this punishment has been one between ancient and deeply rooted beliefs in retribution, atonement or vengeance on the one hand, and, on the other, beliefs in the personal value and dignity of the common man that were born of the democratic movement of the eighteenth century, as well as beliefs in the scientific approach to an understanding of the motive forces of human conduct, which are the result of the growth of the sciences of behavior during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

It is this essentially moral conflict that forms the backdrop for the past changes in and the present operation of our system of imposing death as a punishment for crime. That [2] continues to be my view. For the Clause forbidding cruel and unusual punishments under our constitutional system of government embodies in unique degree moral principles restraining the punishments that our civilized society may impose on those persons who transgress its laws.

A judicial determination whether the punishment of death comports with human dignity is therefore not only permitted, but compelled, by the Clause. I perceive no principled basis for this limitation. An executed person has indeed lost the right to have rights. I would set aside the death sentences imposed in those cases as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

First, the death penalty is excessive. And second, the American people, fully informed as to the purposes of the death penalty and its liabilities, would, in my view, reject it as morally unacceptable. Since the decision in Furman , the legislatures of 35 States have enacted new statutes authorizing the imposition of the death sentence for certain crimes, and Congress has enacted a law providing the death penalty for air piracy resulting in death.

I would be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that these developments have a significant bearing on a realistic assessment of the moral acceptability of the death penalty to the American people. But if the constitutionality of the death penalty turns. In Furman , I observed that the American people are largely unaware of the information critical to a judgment on the morality of the death penalty, and concluded that, if they were better informed, they would consider it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.

A recent study, conducted after the enactment of the post- Furman statutes, has confirmed that the American people know little about the death penalty, and that the opinions of an informed public would differ significantly from those of a public unaware of the consequences and effects of the death penalty.

Even assuming, however, that the post- Furman enactment of statutes authorizing the death penalty renders the prediction of the views of an informed citizenry an uncertain basis for a constitutional decision, the enactment of those statutes has no bearing whatsoever on the conclusion that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it is excessive.

In Furman , I canvassed the relevant data on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. The state of knowledge at that point, after literally centuries of debate, was summarized as follows by a United Nations Committee:. The other principal purpose said to be served by the death penalty is retribution.

The notion that retribution can serve as a moral justification for the sanction of death finds credence in the opinion of my Brothers Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, and that of my Brother White. My Brothers Stewart, Powell, and Stevens offer the following explanation of the retributive justification for capital punishment:. This statement is wholly inadequate to justify the death penalty.

In a related vein, it may be suggested that the expression of moral outrage through the imposition of the death penalty serves to reinforce basic moral values—that it marks some crimes as particularly offensive and therefore to be avoided. This contention, like the previous one, provides no support for the death penalty. They are essentially utilitarian, in that they portray the death penalty as valuable because of its beneficial results. These justifications for the death penalty are inadequate because the penalty is, quite clearly I think, not necessary to the accomplishment of those results.

It is this latter notion, in particular, that I consider to be fundamentally at odds with the Eighth Amendment. The death penalty, unnecessary to promote the goal of deterrence or to further any legitimate notion of retribution, is an excessive penalty forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Cold War America. Sinews of Peace Iron Curtain. Inaugural Address. Declaration of Honorary Citizen of United States o Gideon v.

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After felling the two men, Gregg shot each in the head, execution style, and robbed them of their valuables. Owing to a U. Supreme Court ruling, Furman v. Georgia , that had been handed down just the year before, the state of Georgia had implemented new procedures for trying criminal defendants charged with crimes punishable by death.

Before Furman, in which the Court for the first time struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional, the decision of whether or not to impose capital punishment had been more or less left to the unlimited discretion of juries.

The result was often arbitrary, with African-American, poor, or socially disadvantaged defendants being sentenced to death in disproportionate numbers. After Furman, all 36 states that authorized the death penalty halted executions while procedural safeguards were put in place.

In Georgia, the legislature adopted the following provisions: 1 in trials for capital offenses, guilt or innocence is determined in the first part of a two-part trial, during which the judge is required to instruct the jury about the possibility of finding guilt for other, lesser offenses, 2 after a verdict is handed down, another hearing is conducted as to the possible presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances that could affect the sentence imposed, 3 at least one of 10 aggravating circumstances such as the defendant having a prior criminal record must exist before the death penalty could be imposed, 4 after the death sentence is imposed, it is automatically appealed in order to determine whether it was fairly imposed and is proportional to the crime, and 5 if the death penalty is upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court, that court must include in its decision references to other, similar cases the court has considered.

The trial judge in Gregg followed these procedures. He advised the jury that it could impose either life-in-prison or the death penalty for each of the crimes charged and that it could consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He instructed the jury that the death sentence would apply only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders were committed under any of three possible scenarios that could be considered aggravating: 1 that they were committed in the course of committing other capital crimes, 2 that they were committed to facilitate robbery, or 3 that they were outrageously inhumane.